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Abstract—The development of resilient distributed systems
is seen as essential to maintaining stable business and state-
run processes due to information systems now underpinning
most aspects of society. Cloud computing is now one of the
most pervasive usage paradigms and due its novelty, research
surrounding its resilience is largely lacking and often varied in
terms of developed solutions. Therefore this paper provides an
up-to-date review of resilience work in cloud computing. This
includes methods of measuring and evaluating resilience, solutions
for enabling resilience and alternative architectures developed
with a focus upon ensuring resilience from the ground up. Firstly,
resilience is defined within the context of cloud computing in
order to categorise the work appropriately.
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I. RESILIENCE DISCIPLINES IN CLOUD AND
CONVENTIONAL COMPUTING
Resilience in the context of computer systems and networks,
is known by a number of terms, often the exact descrip-
tion of which differs depending on the context and who is
defining it. For some it is considered synonymous with, or a
measure of fault-tolerance [1]. Some examples of the varied
definitions follow. [2] gives two descriptions of resilience:
”the persistence of dependability when facing changes” and
”the persistence of service delivery that can justifiably be
trusted, when facing changes”. Both definitions describe the
persistence of dependability, although the second may be more
open to interpretation. They are in fact describing a number
of other desirable features of the system, as dependability
contains a number of sub fields, and is also often considered
a subset of trustworthiness. They define ”changes” as any
”failures, attacks or accidents” although arguably this may be
considered somewhat ...
The author in [3] explains that this definition of resilience
describes anything outside the system boundary, whereas de-
pendability metrics often describe those within the boundary.
A similar definition is given by the authors in [4], where they
describe resilience as ”the ability of the network to provide and
maintain an acceptable level of service in the face of various
faults and challenges to normal operation”.
Faults can develop into system failures in the chain of faults,
errors and failures; which describes the process in which
system failures can occur. The measurement of services failures
applies to the majority of the disciplines that will be discussed
so it is important to understand before analysing any terms
further. A failure, or system failure, occurs when a service
deviates from its correct state and no longer provides the
correct service; a result of not meeting it current specification
or the specification being inadequately laid out [5] [4].
An error occurs within a system when it is observed to be
different from the correct system state. An error is caused by a
fault, which may be intentional or non-intentional, and external
or internal. Hence the chain process which may lead to a
service failure whereby a fault may cause an error, and an error
may lead to failure. Other definitions are also given, such as [6]
where ”Resilience is the capacity of critical services to adapt
in order to provide their functionalities in cases of undesired
events compromising parts of the system.” This definition
mostly focuses on modelling the capacity of the system and
thus could be seen as a dependability focused measurement
as it concentrates on internal resources. It is similar to the
definition given by [7] which focuses on resilience from
a business/organisation perspective. ”Resilience refers to the
capacity of human beings/system/organization to survive and
thrive in the face of adversity”...”it is a property that is closely
associated with the capacity to avoid, contain and mitigate
accidents.” Again, this definition focusing upon measuring the
capacity of the system which is likely concerned with the
redundancy inherent within the system, redundancy is often
a main characteristic of fault-tolerance. However this fails to
take into account deliberate acts which are a component of
trustworthiness and also the measurement of characteristics
which cannot also be quantified by capacity.
In [8] the authors simply describe resilience as ”the percent-
age of lost traffic upon failures” another highly quantifiable
measure which fails to take into account other factors such
as those related to trustworthiness. [4] provide a survey of
resilience disciplines in which they describe resilience as
an umbrella term. According to these authors, resilience is
composed of two major sub fields, with each one containing a
number of other disciplines. These two sub-fields are grouped
into those with relating to trustworthiness and challenge tol-
erance. Dependability, (along with security) is grouped into
trustworthiness disciplines. Grouping of these attributes is
similar to the previous definitions in that the attributes are
arranged depending upon their placement relative to their
interaction with the system. However, this definition more
clearly defines the cross overs between sub-fields and the
grouping into trustworthiness and challenge tolerance is more
2logical and defined. A classification of these disciplines is
given in Table 1.
The variety of definitions is perhaps due to the variety of
different fields and disciplines in which resilience could be
measured. Databases, data centres, computer networks , power
transmission networks and business management are just some
examples of this. As each one will have different inherent
characteristics, a number of different models for measuring
resilience appear. Additionally, specific use cases may omit
certain characteristics due to their lesser relevance.
Cloud computing is a subset of computing and therefore
inherits these disciplines, and with it the methods of measuring
and achieving them. However, a major way in which cloud
environments differ from the traditional paradigm, within
the context of the aforementioned disciplines, is through its
dynamic nature and its use-case based variations, driven by
service requirements. In conventional computing systems and
networks, when attempting to adjust or measure the resilience,
it is likely that the internals of the system will not change
too much and therefore the resilience requirements and fea-
tures will also not vary considerably. Cloud environments,
however, do vary due to their constant and sometimes poor
determinism. Which is directly affected by their constant
varying use-cases. It may be difficult to define exactly what
resilience means in terms of computer systems, in general
and for cloud computing, in particular. For the purposes of
this work, it is considered that resilience is the master set
of all aforementioned disciplines. Where each discipline is
either a quantification, or feature enabled through a particular
implementation, which helps describe the overall resilience of
the system. This is adhering to the definitions as given in
[4]. Within the context of cloud resilience, it is necessary to
understand this chain as system-failures are the challenge in
which the system must be resilient against.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART IN CLOUD RESILIENCE
The previous sections highlighted the complexity and con-
tentious nature surrounding the variety of resilient characteris-
tics and disciplines. In short, resilience may be considered con-
text specific, in that the varying use cases should directly drive
the requirements. The combination of resilience within cloud
computing environments thus complicates the situation further
due to the open-ended uses available for cloud environments.
Therefore in a general sense, as inherited from traditional
computing, resiliency of a cloud environment could be the
quality of its trusted service delivery. Where quality varies
depending upon the exact service constraints, where trusted
is an assumed requirement that must be verifiable and the
delivery is a boolean value. The ratio of successful, verifiable
delivery is therefore a measure of the resilience of the cloud
system.
Like all computing environments, cloud environments con-
sist of multiple layers. What may distinguish the layered nature
of cloud environments from the layered aspect of conventional
computing environments, is that the layers within cloud may
have different stake holders and are managed by different
actors. This is considered different to the delivery models of
cloud environments (IaaS/PaaS/SaaS) which are also layered
but are concerned with pricing and service as opposed to the
application, control or measurement of resilience.
Therefore due to this layered nature of cloud architectures,
the following survey of cloud resilience categorises work
according to the layer in which the work focuses upon. This
is important to the direction of the study as although works
may sometimes employ similar techniques, the focus of the
resilience has a direct effect on specific layers and may be
employed different stake holders. Therefore this categorisation
occurs due to the service-oriented nature of cloud environments
but with a focus upon the management of resilience within
that layer. Currently there is no process for the investigation
of resilience in the cloud so this layer based investigation
was decided in order to categorise and compare the current
literature. The layers were developed through an iterative
process during the literature survey. The concept of the model
is based upon the general layered model of cloud service
delivery but due to the variations in resilience is adapted. It is
similar to the classification of attacks and defences proposed
by [9] which categorises the threats and defences according to
their intended target. In this variation focused upon resilience,
the defences are defined by their intended target but also within
the context of their stake-holders. As the resilience of each
layer may be directly altered by different stake-holders the
work is grouped as such.
The proposed layers being as follows:
• VM - Instance Resilience - the work in this layer de-
scribes resilience techniques which focus upon providing
resilience to an individual instance such as a virtual
machine or container.
• Multi-VM - Platform Resilience - these works are
concerned with cloud services which are composed of
multiple instances and the way in which resilience may
be managed between these instances.
• Data-Centre - Management Layer resilience these
works are concerned with data centre management tech-
niques which may provide resilience via the intercon-
nection of multiple physical machines.
• Data-Centre - Networking and Physical Layer Re-
silience The works in this layer are concerned with the
physical layer (e.g. hardware) and networking within the
datacentre.
Most of reported research within the area of cloud resilience
focused upon specific layers of the cloud environment, as
shown in Tables I-IV. Some other work have modelled different
factors which affect resilience within cloud infrastructures;
while fewer research has been reported where proposal for
new additions or or complete changes in cloud architecture
were advocated. The latter research forms part of the focus
of our research, where the intention is to shed light on
some promising trends in cloud computing resilience with
completely alternative architectures. This is further discussed
in the next section
3TABLE I. SUMMARY OF RESILIENCE DISCIPLINES
Discipline Requirements Description Type Superset
Survivability Diversity and Redundancy Facing component and system fail-
ures
Feature Challenge
Tolerance
Fault Tolerance Redundancy Recover from random faults Feature Challenge
Tolerance,
Survivability
Traffic Tolerance Redundancy, Scalability,
Bandwidth
Survive varied increases in traffic Feature Challenge
Tolerance
Disruption Tolerance Routing Techniques Disruption of communication paths Feature Challenge
Tolerance
Dependability reliability, availability, main-
tainability, safety
Quantification of Service Delivery Quantification Trustworthiness
Reliability ?? - Continuity of service Quantification Trustworthiness -
Dependability
Maintainability Ability to change The ability to undergo system
changes
Feature Trustworthiness,
Dependability
Safety ?? - Dependability during critical fail-
ures
Feature Trustworthiness,
Dependability
Security Availability, integrity, con-
fidentiality, nonrepudability,
auditability, authorisability,
authenticity
Protection against unauthorised
change or access according to
policy
System Property Trustworthiness
availability ?? Readiness for service Quantification Trustworthiness,
Security,
Dependability
Integrity Cryptography and verification ”absence of improper system alter-
ations”
Feature Trustworthiness,
Security,
Dependability
Confidentiality Cryptography The ability to keep data and actions
secret
Feature Trustworthiness,
Security,
Dependability
Nonrepudability Cryptography Ensuring a user cannot deny an
action or reciept
Feature Trustworthiness,
Security,
Dependability
Auditabiltiy Accurate Logging Ability to keep accurate logs Feature Trustworthiness,
Security,
Dependability
Authorisability Polcies, Credential Manage-
ment
Granting and denying permissions
to resources according to policies
Feature Trustworthiness,
Security,
Dependability
Authenticity Cryptograph Ensuring the integrity of message,
sender, content and meta data (time
etc.)
Feature Trustworthiness,
Security,
Dependability
Performance - QoS
TABLE II. INSTANCE LAYER RESILIENCE
Work Method Feature
[10] Reactive error ranking and appropriate technique
[11] Reactive introspection
[12] Proactive high diversity for replica storage
[13] Proactive memory stored backups
TABLE III. PLATFORM LAYER RESILIENCE
Work Method Feature
[14] Service Composition Graph based, interdepdency
[15] Service Composition Agent-based
[16] Low Level Diversity data-centre
[17] Quality Adjustment brownout
[18] Diversity Replicas
Diversity Structure height
TABLE IV. INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT RESILIENCE
Work Method Feature
[19] Organisation VM Scheduling for resilience
[20] Disaster Recovery Storage
[21] Reactive reset upon fault Hypervisor
[22] Proactive Diversity Hypervisor
[23] QoR Evaluation Proactive service provisioning
TABLE V. INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKING RESILIENCE
Work Method Feature
[24] Diversity Geo-distribution
[25] VM to PHY Mapping Design
[26] VM to PHY Mapping Backup links
[27] Redundancy VNet backup links
III. ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURES FOR CLOUD
COMPUTING RESILIENCE
Some work will choose to encourage a conventionally differ-
ent cloud architecture in order to provide increased resilience
(Fig. 4). Although being an alternative to the infrastructure
layer discussed in the previous section, the authors present
SlapOS [28], choosing to provide a purely distributed cloud
architecture where the issue of single point of failure is
remedied through distributed the cloud resources over multiple
PCs within homes, as opposed to within Data Centres. Whilst
this might obviously bring forth issues regarding bandwidth,
4TABLE VI. RESILIENCE THROUGH ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURES
Work Method Feature
[28] Decentralisation SOHO Device architecture
[29] Decentralisation Community Cloud
[29] Decentralisation Leader Selection Optimisation
[30] Diversity and Redundancy Multi-layer service aware manner
[31] Diversity Constant evolution
[32] Diversity Execution and I/O redirection
[33] Redundancy Mature components with internal redundancy
[34] Redundancy Resource prediciton
[35] Diversity and Intellignece Novel Service provisioning
capacity and latency the benefits of reducing single point of
failure are unparalleled during decentralisation, particular for
safety-critical events such as those during disaster events.
Resilience within SlapOS is again the focus in [29]. The
authors highlight the lack of resiliency within a conventional
IaaS cloud as motivation for their work and the development
of SlapOS. The authors reiterate the lack of resilience within
current cloud architecture’s due to the centralised data centre
model. They refer to the concept of community cloud, whereby
the cloud is collaboratively built from personal devices. The
main current issues are summarised as:
• Migrating from commodity cloud to resilient, secure and
dependable clouds
• Promoting diverse and open ecosystems
• Building a coherent, modular and reusable architecture
When considering a distributed cloud, the leader selection
problem is highlighted [29] (the process of selecting the next
master node after loss of the current). Whilst this a valid
issue, it perhaps signifies the need to me to purely distributed
cloud architectures. Further issues relating to resilience of their
application include: implementation an accurate failure detec-
tion methods, and methods of replicating the master database
prior to handover to another master node. An interesting point
made by the authors is that using the SlapOS architecture, the
conventional delivery models of infrastructure, platform and
service delivery become obsolete. Finally, the authors explain
that an implementation of hierarchical masters (such as with
DNS) will be implemented for increased resilience. Whilst
the architecture and delivery model is certainly interesting
with this work there are issues directly relating to resilience
concerning master node hierarchies which undoubtedly cause
problems. A decentralised system such as this is not as resilient
as one which is purely distributed.
Community cloud based resilience is also discussed in [36]
which promotes the model as an enhancer for organisational re-
silience. As with the work of SlapOS, the authors highlight the
ownership and location issues of current cloud models being
unsuitable for providing resilience. A point of interest by the
author is that for natural disasters centralised disaster recovery
tends to become too late and too excessive, the author argues
that disaster recovery must be conducted by the community
level. The breakdown of communication networks is cited as
a key issue here, where the more effective communication
was developed by the decentralised communities. The author
explains that community cloud models enable all the benefits
of public cloud offerings whilst enabling greater control. Issues
surround community clouds, such as malicious users, are said
to be mitigated through user vetting, a process which may not
always be practical or effective.
An architecture known as DefCloud [30] attempts to provide
greater resilience through increasing diversity and redundancy
within all layers of the cloud architecture. The architecture is
also flexible, in that it allows resilience to be adjusted in a
”service-aware manner”. This might be argued to be similar
in concept to the usability vs security trade-off. Such a feature
is likely necessary for a cloud platform which accommodates
a wide spectrum of use-cases. The first key point in designing
the infrastructure, as argued by the authors, is the removal of
monoculture which, for example, enables malware and attacks
to propagate effectively through only needing to attack one
type of hardware architecture or software application. This
reduction of monoculture is then applied to all layers of the
cloud infrastructure. Firstly is the infrastructure layer diversity.
This is encompasses data-centre diversity and cloud diversity.
Where data-centre diversity is best considered as sub-trees of
features where similar trees are not selected in tandem in order
to maximise diversity. For example similar trees will utilise the
same network vendor hardware or operating systems. Whilst
diversity provides resilience against security related failures,
it does not protect against failures due direct physical data
centre attacks, e.g. natural disasters or military attacks (such
as an EMP). In order to mitigate these issues, the architecture
then applies cloud diversity through distributing the cloud over
multiple geo-locations, using varying ISPs.
After the infrastructure layer, the DefCloud then assures
resilience through Process-level Program diversity, where the
diversity focuses upon distribution via space and time. Where
the spatial diversity is concerned with distribution of differing
versions across the cloud whilst the temporal diversity is
concerned with varying application configurations over time.
In short, application diversity ensures individual binaries are
diverse meaning that an attack on one application binary will
not apply to another. Whilst this has profound consequences on
the current state of 0-day exploits, it creates a large number
of issues for the software development process. Whilst the
architecture uncountably covers resilience in the cloud through
heavy adaptions of the conventional architecture, the system
lacks real implementation or simulation and thus its resilience
is yet to be determined. For one, the complexity of the system
is clearly greater and therefore the number of attack points
rises also.
Similar diversity may be seen in the MEERKATS system
[31] which as a fully novel architecture for cloud security,
which focuses on a security mission critical cloud. The sys-
tem constantly evolves across all aspects, reducing monocul-
ture and increasing diversity. One component of the system,
DREME [32], is concerned with execution diversity of replicas
and provides a framework for I/O redirection.
IBM present a somewhat novel architecture name SCE+ [33]
which is built from the ground up to be highly resilient. The au-
thors make the distinction between typical cloud architectures
employed by Amazon and Google by explaining that they are
constructed from ”redundant, inexpensive, expendable building
5blocks” whereas the IBM SCE+ employs ”high-end building
blocks with significant internal redundancy and an established
track record of very high MTBF for every element.” In short, it
would appear that the contrast is in SCE+ employing mature
and extremely resilient fewer components with conventional
architectures employing many less mature components and
relying upon replication/redundancy.
The architecture applies resiliency to differing layers within
the cloud. The physical layer is designed so as to avoid single
point of failure, through division of resources and replica-
tion in separate geo-locations with a backup dark-fibre link.
Software resilience is then considered from multiple aspects.
Components are deployed in redundant pairs and constant
”health-checks” are in place to monitor correct functioning.
In addition, redundancy of data and regular backups ensures
resiliency within the data layer. The authors go on to explain
that standardisation of hardware within the system components
aids the resilience, however this is contentious, as diversity
within hardware is surely a necessity for resiliency. They
also cite virtualisation as an enabling factor of the resilience,
however this a typically a component of cloud infrastructures
anyway and therefore offers the environment no additional ad-
vantage. Overall the architecture offers a variety of additional
components for resilience although some are questionable such
as the physical distance between components as well as the
added complexity within the system.
Moving away from a traditional cloud architecture, improv-
ing the resilience of Hybrid Mobile Clouds is the focus in [34].
Mobile clouds require greater resilience than a static system
due to the dynamic network characteristics. The proposed
architecture is interesting due to its flexibility in running on
a variety of device types, essentially ignoring the underlying
hardware. The resilience requirements are also aided through
a resource prediction mechanism and an early failure detection
mechanism to facilitate handover of vital services. The system
proves successful, although performance is still dependent
upon the quantity of fixed nodes within the cloud, making
the system not purely mobile. However, overall it exhibits a
good example of how cloud systems can be built upon non-
deterministic environments.
An architecture based on biologically inspired processes
which allows tunable redundancy at multiple cloud levels,
known as BioRAC is presented in [35]. One layer of the
architecture involves division of components into ”cells” which
allows dynamic real-time configuration and combine together
to form an ”organism” which then is then applied to a
particular goal. In an additional layer, the system provides
high levels of diversity through varying execution and finally
it provides intelligent algorithms for collaborative thread alert
and detection. Although lacking an implementation or proper
evaluation, the architecture is interesting in providing a system
designed with resilience from the ground up with novel com-
ponents, as opposed to those adapted on top of conventional
systems. However the system is undoubtedly complex due its
multiple layers which has an adverse effect upon its complexity
and thus its resilience. With lacking any implementation it is
difficult to assess its resilience although the techniques and
concept are certainly of merit.
IV. ANALYSIS: RESEARCH GAPS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
After an analysis of the previous work in Cloud computing
resilience, a number of research gaps can be highlighted for
future research and directions. This work can span multiple
levels. But specifically, is concerned with resilience in cloud
environments, which are disparate from the traditional cloud
architectures. As mentioned previously, traditional cloud envi-
ronments are essentially resilient by nature, which is mostly
due to the high redundancy involved but also due to the ability
for a user to customise a cloud service or application with their
own features and then enable this resilience according to their
own SLA with the provider.
What seems to be largely missing from the literature is
research which focuses upon cloud resilience in more con-
strained and less deterministic environments. Such work is
highly relevant due to the nature of emerging cloud disciplines
e.g. mobile cloud, fog computing and edge computing. Such
constrained environments have less ability to fall back upon
redundancy in order to provide their resilience and must rely on
more complex methods. They might also employ a variety of
diversity related techniques due to disparate hardware involved.
A key factor which is deemed relevant to the growing field of
cloud computing, which is not fully investigated, is how does
the effect of resilience upon one layer, affect the resilience
of another layer? For example, if resilience is enabled by a
user in the platform/service oriented layers but the underlying
physical layer has low resilience, is it still possible to increase
resilience in this manner? Such a topic is highly relevant to
the way in which cloud architectures are evolving to more
mobile and less deterministic networks and away from highly
deterministic data centre environment. Another area which is
not touched upon sufficiently is the ability to dynamically ad-
just within constrained environments, whilst some work within
engineering has focused upon applying dynamic algorithms to
graph analysis and optimisation, little work has been conducted
which leveraged this for the cloud environments. Once more,
this has particular relevance for mobile environments due to
the constrained resources available for optimisations, machine
learning has seen some efforts in this area but further work can
involve an evaluation and comparison of different algorithms
for both traditional and mobile cloud environments.
Another area which could be expanded upon is the theoret-
ical nature of enabling resilience within the context of various
constraints. This has particular relevance to cloud SLA but also
to constrained models. It concerns the analysis of requirements
to enable the degree of resilience for the service. As resilience
is a scale as opposed to a binary value, such a model could
aid the construction of a service within its given constraints
across all cloud service models.
In terms of physical layer resilience, the exact effect upon
resilience in the cloud with different levels of diverse hardware
has seen minimal work. Therefore, future research directions
in this area could see the exact effect of diversification of
hardware resources upon the resilience of a system could
be investigated. Barriers to this research mostly involve cost
and time; as the necessary hardware, proprietary licenses and
6TABLE VII. BIO-INSPIRED DOMAINS MEETING FUTURE DEMANDS FOR UNCONVENTIONAL CLOUD COMPUTING RESILIENCE
Bio-Inspired Technique Information
Capacity
Network
Adaptability
Network Conver-
gence
Structural Redun-
dancy
Structural Diver-
sity
Epigenetic High Medium Finalised High Low
Phylogenetic Medium Medium Dynamic High Low
Ontogenetic Low Medium Dynamic High Medium
Swarm - Societal Medium High Dynamic High Low
practical work involved in evaluating these scenarios ensures
it is difficult to implement. However, simulations may enabled
a realisation of evaluating this approach.
Despite being used as inspiration for a variety of opti-
misation and resilience methods throughout engineering and
computing, minimal work can be seen within the area of
cloud resilience which leverages bio-inspired work. Biological
systems have been shown to have innate resilience, which may
seem particularly relevant due to the high-complexity of these
systems, which is similar to the application of resilience in
cloud systems. Therefore, this lack of work highlights a huge
potential area for further application of biological systems to
cloud computing environments.
Undoubtedly, biological systems provide resilience as in the
definition adopted above. Nature has found ways for life to
persist, guaranteeing the delivery of a ”service” (or life) in the
face of many changes. However, to fit in with the proposed
model, which treats resilience as an umbrella term for a variety
of sub-fields, nature also provides this resilience across varied
and diverse use-cases. The huge number of different scales and
types of life such as animals as an entity, swarm-based systems
such as ants, and more complex systems (such as the earth
ecosystem), which consist of a variety of sub-organisms; has
shown that a number of scales of resilience may be achieved
through differing characteristics, depending on the use-case.
Table 2 present and map the main bio-inspired dimensions
with these characteristics.
Given the inherent resilience of biological systems pre-
sented in this section, this analysis seeks to understand which
particular techniques they employ and how they are useful
to resilience in computing. Therefore, an approach is taken
which compares two key aspects of resilience: redundancy
and diversity. In addition to the characteristics the techniques
employ to optimise or converge upon a solution. A highlighted
characteristic within literature, which enables their resilience,
is their ability to adapt through learning, some being able
to continuously adapt (swarm techniques), whilst others will
eventually converge on a given solution (Genetics). The ability
to converge may allow a system to become optimal at a
particular solution, but leave it liable to attack. In contrast,
a system which continues to adapt may never be able to
provide appropriate functionality for one solution. Another
characteristic is the quantity of information each system con-
tains at both an atomic and network scale layer. For example,
epigenetic nodes hold very little information and are largely
concerned with functional/processing characteristics, such as
with Neural Networks and Immune systems’ simplicity at each
node. In contrast, the nodes within an ontogenetic system will
hold considerably more information, processing information
locally with each node’s distinct functionality. The inherent
distributed nature of all biological systems ensures they are
all the ability to apply scalable levels of redundancy rather
effectively. However, diversity will vary, ontogenetic systems
for example, provide considerably greater diversity within their
atomic units and system than those of epigenetic systems
which are considerably more similar to one another. Although
the ability to create further diversity from the atomic unit
should also be of note. For example, while the ontogenetic
systems may develop into complex systems with considerable
diversity than that of the epigenetic, these systems develop
from the phylogenetic processes and if flaws exist from this
process, they can propagate through the entire system, making
it weaker therefore. Whilst biological systems can be seen to
enable resilience, and optimisation, of different levels within
computing; they are applied in different ways. Swarm-based
systems, AIS and ANNs all apply a minimalistic algorithm,
which was modelled from a biological process. Others, such
as computer viruses take a broader concept and apply it to
computing systems. Few works within literature are seen to
apply multiple layers of a biological system to an architecture.
This may be for a number of reasons, such as a lack of seen
necessity, i.e. if only one aspect needs optimising within a
conventional system then why replace all of it? It might also be
due to the complexities of biological systems causing problems
when attempting to model it. If it is difficult for scientists
to understand the interactions between these layers, then it
is likely too difficult for engineers to map them. Therefore,
a point which should be considered during this application
of biological techniques to man-made engineering; focuses
upon applying models of complimentary layers of a biological
system, in tandem. In order to create a bio-inspired system
which is more considered to be like an ALife than just a single
algorithm or application.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Resilience in computing systems is covered by a number
of definitions, though it is mostly considered as the superset
of a large number of sub-disciplines, which provide differing
characteristics and functionalities to enable the given service.
The three components of diversity, redundancy and intelligent
organisation are recurring themes within this review and as
such are considered key enablers of resilience. However due
to the service driven nature of cloud environments the enabling
methods of resilience vary considerably depending on the use-
case. As such in order to provide a comprehensive resilience
method it may be necessary to explore those which cover
all layers which were previously discussed in this paper. Of
particular note are those architectures which are unconven-
tional, as traditional architectures have been shown to be
somewhat resilient but only through expensive methods such
7as redundancy. Therefore alternative solutions may be the most
optimal method of providing holistic resilience solutions to the
wide and varied use-cases prevalent within cloud computing
environments.
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